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Understanding component reliability helps designers 
create more robust future designs and supports efficient 
and cost-effective operations of existing machines. The 
accelerator community can leverage the commonality of 
its high-vacuum and high-power systems with those of the 
magnetic fusion community to gain access to a larger 
database of reliability data. Reliability studies performed 
under the auspices of the International Energy Agency 
are the result of an international working group, which 
has generated a component failure rate database for 
fusion experiment components. The initial database work 
harvested published data and now analyzes operating 
experience data. This paper discusses the usefulness of 
reliability data, describes the failure rate data collection 
and analysis effort, discusses reliability for components 
with scarce data, and points out some of the intersections 
between magnetic fusion experiments and accelerators. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past 50 years, reliability has become an 
important aspect of the increasingly sophisticated and 
complex tools being used and designed for modern life.1
Reliability is also inherent in many aspects of nuclear 
systems and facility operations. Operational reliability 
data are the best source of information on component life 
and health, however, because the components are 
operating within their planned environment and 
undergoing their true operational demands. 
There are several reasons to study reliability.2 One 
key reason is that properly used reliability analyses can 
make a system or an entire facility more efficient. Modest 
investment in computerized data collection and analyst 
time has demonstrably resulted in cost savings, improved 
operational efficiency, and life cycle planning.3 Some 
facilities are now being designed with a facility reliability 
or operational availability target in mind. For example, 
the International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility has 
a goal of 70% availability and the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) has a goal 
of 3,000 pulses per year.4,5 In addition, operational data 
aid in determining spare parts inventories and component 
replacements, establishing preventive maintenance 
programs, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
systems, the impact systems have on experiment data, and 
the number and skills of maintenance personnel needed. 
In fusion research, reliability affects efficiency because 
better-operating machines produce higher quality and 
more timely data than machines that break down often 
and require venting to atmospheric pressure for repairs. 
A second reason for reliability analyses is that data 
derived from operating experience help designers prevent 
propagation of operational problems in system or facility 
retrofits, modifications, or enhancements, as well as new 
designs to be constructed. For example, when designers 
determine that parts or components work well, they can 
confidently use the parts in future designs. When 
designers learn of deficiencies, they can use more robust 
parts, alter the design, add redundant or diverse 
components, de-rate the operation of the component, or 
use other means to increase the reliability.  
The third reason to study reliability is that when 
safety or environmental issues exist with a system or 
facility, the collection of operating experience data will 
support a variety of safety and risk analyses6 or 
probabilistic safety assessment of hazardous materials 
(flammable, toxic, radioactive).7 For example, in the 
1980s the offshore oil and chemical process industries 
began collecting data for safety assessment after some 
tragic accidents (the Piper Alpha oil rig explosion in 1988 
and the Bhopal pesticide plant disaster in 1984). The 
chemical and petroleum industries now perform limited 
probabilistic safety assessments, focused on offsite 
consequences to the public from energetic events.8
A fourth reason for reliability study pertains to 
radiological safety. Observing the operating experiences 
of engineered systems, especially near-failures and 
failures that result in hazardous energy release, is the key 
to managing production stoppage, substandard quality, 
facility damage, and injuries to personnel.9 When 
facilities use or create radioactive materials, even in small 
quantities, a safety analysis report or safety assessment 
document is needed to show that the facility is well 
designed and is a responsible steward of radiological 
materials.10,11 Presently, magnetic fusion is using the 
traditional, conservative safety analysis12 combined with 
risk assessment techniques to address radiological 
safety.13–15 For accelerators, the amount of radioactive 
material created may be only a few grams per year, but 
hazard, safety, and risk analyses could be called upon to 
support an application for an operating license.  
Particle accelerators have two very important 
qualities that are quite attractive to reliability studies. The 
first quality is that accelerators use very high numbers of 
similar components, often dozens to thousands of one 
type of component. Because of the cost savings of large 
vendor orders and simpler maintenance training, 
accelerator staffs tend to use just one brand of component 
and subsequently stock only that brand’s replacement 
parts or subcomponents, which creates very large and 
uniform component “populations.” Both of these aspects 
lead to obtaining good statistical data. The second quality 
is that accelerators strive to operate in one or more 
campaigns of several thousand hours per calendar year. 
Therefore, accelerators can accumulate high-confidence 
statistics on component and system reliability in just a 
few years. Smaller experiments with fewer components 
and less run time, such as magnetic fusion experiments, 
usually require over a decade of accumulated operating 
time to produce meaningful component failure rate data.  
This paper describes ongoing work to support 
magnetic fusion experiment operations and safety. 
Parallels exist between fusion and accelerator research in 
terms of equipment and technologies employed. 
Operating experience from magnetic fusion components 
can be applied to accelerator components. 
II. DATA GATHERING TASK 
In the 1980s, the Fusion Safety Program at the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL) recognized the need for 
probabilistic safety assessment of magnetic fusion 
experiments that used radioactive, gaseous tritium fuel 
and created radioactive materials by neutron activation.16
Work began to assemble sets of generic failure rate data 
for fusion components.17,18 Initially, work focused on 
water, liquid metal, and gas cooling systems, then 
expanded to include vacuum systems, confinement 
building components, and some initiating event 
frequencies for use in risk assessment. These “generic” 
data typically indicate a reasonable or correct order of 
magnitude for component failure rates of a particular type 
of component (e.g., pipe run, valve, tank); the data are 
useful for comparing design alternatives, using in 
reliability-availability-maintainability-inspectability 
(RAMI) and system-level failure modes and effects 
analysis (FMEA), or applying probabilistic risk 
assessment techniques during conceptual and preliminary 
design. A few failure rate values are given in Table I as 
examples. 
TABLE I. Representative Generic Data  
for Use in Data Analysis18
Component and Failure Mode 
Average 
Value
(/hr) 
Error 
Factora
Liquid metal pipe, leakage/ 
rupture 
1.6E?09 30 
Liquid metal valve, fail to operate 5E?08 30 
Liquid metal mechanical pump, 
fail to operate 
3.5E?05 10 
Liquid metal electromagnetic 
pump, fail to operate 
1E?06 10 
Rupture disk, leakage/rupture 1.9E?04 10 
Gas piping, all failure modes 3E?10 100 
Gas valve, all failure modes 3E?06 10 
Electric drive gas circulator, all 
failure modes 
1E?04 10 
a. This error factor is the 90% confidence bound 
estimate divided by the nominal failure rate value. 
After data collection was begun at the INL, an 
opportunity for collaboration arose among countries 
researching fusion energy. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA), based in Paris, France, proposed a 
cooperative agreement on the environmental, safety, and 
economic aspects of fusion power (known as IEA-
ESE/FP). Within the agreement, task 5 is the assembly of 
a fusion component failure rate database. Participating 
countries lend support to the task by having cognizant 
safety researchers meet to share information and ideas. 
The task participants have agreed to undertake two paths: 
a short-term data harvesting path described above where 
generic sets of data are collected and a longer-term path to 
perform data analysis from existing facilities.19
II.A. Harvesting Generic Failure Rate Data 
Moss and Strutt have pointed out the value of data 
harvesting for design support.20 These generic data can 
support system availability assessment and modeling, 
hazard and operability studies favored in the chemical and 
petroleum industries, and RAMI and FMEA, which are 
fundamental reliability analysis tools. 
In 1992, IEA-ESE/FP task 5 participants began 
collaborations and shared handbook and generic data 
values from the documents listed in Table II and other 
sources.19–22 Published fusion and accelerator experiences 
were surveyed for useful data along with information 
from other industries. Several of these reports have 
documented findings on magnets, cryogenic components, 
vacuum components, in-vessel cooling systems, and 
alternate coolants.23–29 The data collection work was later 
expanded to include more industrial aspects of fusion 
operations, including various plant sensors, fire protection 
systems, electrical power distribution, various safety 
equipment, and aspects of maintenance operations.30–36
All of these data were placed in a computerized database 
under IEA task participant care.37–39 The IEA database is 
restricted to IEA member country participants, however, 
and task 5 limits database access to those persons working 
in magnetic fusion safety. Therefore, analysts outside of 
fusion should use the individual published data reports, 
most of which are listed in this paper. Many of these 
reports are available through www.osti.gov. 
The accelerator community has chosen a similar path 
to examine data from facilities and maintains the 
Accelerator Reliability Database.40 Access to this 
database is also restricted to members. 
II.B. Failure Data Collection and Analysis 
The second part of IEA-ESE/FP task 5 is to collect 
and analyze operational data from existing fusion 
facilities. Most of the tokamaks and other fusion 
experiments have set up trouble report databases,41–46
keep logbooks of operations, and document operations in 
annual reports. The data selected for task 5 collection 
support any of three attributes that must be studied for 
fusion experiments: public safety, personnel safety, or 
fusion experiment operational availability. 
As task 5 has progressed, opportunities have arisen to 
analyze collected data at some fusion facilities. For 
example, the Tritium Systems Test Assembly at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, a fusion fuel cycle testing 
and technology demonstration facility, collected their 
trouble report data.42,47 From that set of data (system 
component counts, system operating practices, operating 
times, and counts of demands for component operation), 
several statistical analyses have been performed on the 
trouble report data set.48–53 Similar analyses have been 
completed on comparable facilities in the European Union 
(EU)54,55 and in Japan.56,57 Comparisons between these 
data sets have been made, with fair to good results.58,59
TABLE II. Selected Generic Data Sources Available for 
the IEA Fusion Component Failure Rate Data Bank 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Component 
Reliability Data for Use in Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment, TECDOC-478 (1988) 
IAEA, Evaluation of Reliability Data Sources, TECDOC-
504 (1989) 
IAEA, Manual on Reliability Data Collection for 
Research Reactor PSAs, TECDOC-636 (1992) 
IAEA, Generic Component Reliability Data for Research 
Reactor PSAs, TECDOC-930 (1997) 
OREDA, Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, Second 
Edition, DnV Technica (1992) 
D. I. GERTMAN, W. E. GILMORE, W. J. GALYEAN, 
M. R. GROH, C. D. GENTILLON, B. G. GILBERT, 
W. J. REECE, Nuclear Computerized Library for 
Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR), NUREG/CR-
4639, Volume 5, Data Manual, Revision 3, INL (1990) 
CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY and 
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION, Guidelines for Process Equipment 
Reliability Data, American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers (1989) 
ATV OFFICE and STUDSVIK AB, T-Book, Reliability 
Data of Components in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants,
Third Edition, Vattenfall AB (1992) 
D. C. ARULANANTHAM and F. P. LEES, “Some Data 
on the Reliability of Pressure Equipment in the Chemical 
Plant Environment,” Int. J. Pres. Ves. Pip., 9, 327 (1981) 
POWER SYSTEMS RELIABILITY SUBCOMMITTEE, 
IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable 
Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Std 
493-1997, IEEE (1997) 
W. DENSON, G. CHANDLER, W. CROWELL, 
A. CLARK, P. JAWORSKI, Nonelectronic Parts 
Reliability Data 1995, NPRD-95, Reliability Analysis 
Center (1995) 
W. CROWELL, W. DENSON, P. JAWORSKI and 
D. MAHAR, Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions,
FMD-97, Reliability Analysis Center (1997) 
G. W. HANNAMAN, GCR (Gas Cooled Reactor) 
Reliability Data Bank Status Report, GA-A-14839, 
General Atomic Co. (1978) 
S. A. EIDE, S. V. CHMIELEWSKI, and T. D. SWANTZ, 
Generic Component Failure Data Base for Light Water 
and Liquid Sodium Reactor PRAs, EGG-SSRE-8875, INL 
(1990) 
A. BLANCHARD and B. N. ROY, Savannah River Site 
Generic Data Base Development, WSRC-TR-93-262, 
Revision 1, Savannah River Site (1998) 
The EU has also begun analyzing data from tokamak 
experiments.54,60 Vacuum components were an initial 
focus of the EU work because fusion devices were 
growing in size and radiological inventory and the 
vacuum vessel had become an important radiological 
confinement barrier. Companion work was performed on 
the largest U.S. tokamak, the DIII-D experiment, to 
compare to the EU results.61,62 Other data analyses have 
focused on personnel gas safety monitors, power supplies, 
and other components (see Table III).63–66 Radiological 
experiences, including which groups of facility personnel 
receive the highest doses, have been surveyed and 
compared between fusion experiments.67–70 Industrial 
safety experiences at two major fusion facilities have been 
surveyed and compared to large particle accelerators.71,72
III. RELIABILITY ESTIMATES WITH SCARCE 
DATA 
There are many cases in fusion where few operating 
experience data exist to support quantitative reliability 
estimation. Several authors have addressed this dilemma. 
One of the earliest noted approaches was given by Welker 
and Lipow,74 who addressed the failure rate for a 
component that has not yet failed in service. This 
approach is to take whatever operating time is available 
for the unfailed component(s) and estimate a failure rate 
of 1/3T, where T is the cumulative component operating 
hours. This simple calculation would give an estimate of 
the “all modes” component failure rate. Tobias and 
Trinidade suggested using a Chi-squared distribution and  
calculating an upper bound failure rate as a realistic 
estimate that accounts for the number of unfailed 
components in the system.75 They warned that using the 
50% Chi-squared failure rate as a point estimate should be 
interpreted carefully; the value is not really an average but 
rather a failure rate value that will produce zero failures 
half of the time. The IAEA has also suggested using the 
50% Chi-squared average value for a failure rate and 
calculating the upper bound failure rate using the same 
distribution.76
Component test data can be used to estimate the 
reliability of a component if the tests have been extensive 
enough to approximate a component lifetime and the test 
conditions are approximate to actual operating conditions. 
An example is high heat flux testing of wall armor tiles 
with the use of electron beams. Tiles of different materials 
have been fixed to substrate materials with a variety of 
processes (e.g., brazing, hot isostatic pressing, and 
diffusion welding) and these have been tested under 
vacuum with rapid electron beam heat deposition at 
magnitudes 2 to 10 times higher than would be expected 
in the operating tokamak. The reliability premise is that 
the excessively rapid heatup and cooldown cycles on the 
tile and its bond are the most harsh conditions the tile unit 
will experience. Therefore, testing at thousands of short-
duration heat loading/unloading cycles will provide 
relevant data. Thus far, such testing results have proven to 
give favorable reliability estimates when compared to the 
positive operating experiences of deployed tiles.77
TABLE III. Overall Failure Rates for Resistive Magnet Coil Power Supplies 
Power Supply System 
Number of 
Faults in 
Trouble Reports 
System Run Time
(hr) 
Failure Rate 
(/hr) 
±Standard 
Error
DIII-D magnetic fusion experiment data from 1987–2004 (Ref. 65) 
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems— 
All Modes or Generic Trouble 
1,422 13,150 1.1E–01 2.9E–03
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems—
Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset 
181 13,150 1.4E–02 1.0E–03
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems—Fail to 
Operate and Spurious Operation 
1,241 13,150 9.4E–02 2.7E–03
Joint European Torus magnetic fusion experiment data from 1997-2003 (Ref. 65) 
JET Coil Power Supply Systems— 
Generic Trouble 
990 14,864 6.7E–02 2.1E–03 
JET Coil Power Supply Systems—Alarm/Erratic 
Alarm/Fail to Preset 
534 14,864 3.6E–02 1.6E–03 
JET Coil Power Supply Systems— 
Fail to Operate and Spurious Operation 
456 14,864 3.1E–02 1.4E–03 
DA?NE accelerator power supplies, from 1997–2002 (Ref. 73) 
DA?NE Coil Power Supplies—All modes 535 39,984 1.3E?02 5.8E?04
When no operating experience data exist for a 
component, such as a component in the design phase, the 
analyst has several options:78
? Decomposition—deconstructing a component into its 
constituent parts and then assigning handbook failure 
rates to the parts. If the analyst is confident in the 
accuracy of part data, this technique is tedious but 
useful; if the data on parts are not accurate, other 
techniques should be used. 
? Analyst judgment—may call for reverse estimation 
based on a system availability requirement or simply 
engineering judgment of the generic failure rates for 
that class of component. 
? Expert opinion—obtaining qualitative opinions from 
subject matter experts and combining those to 
develop an order-of-magnitude failure rate. 
? Component-specific techniques—for example, the 
Thomas method for piping.79
V. FUTURE PLANS 
The IEA task agreement is being renewed for another 
5-year term. The renewal serves as a vehicle for continued 
collaboration between task participants. At present, plans 
are for the data analysis of DIII-D and Joint European 
Torus (JET) operating experience data to continue 
indefinitely and perhaps to add other tokamaks as well.  
The INL Fusion Safety Program work on system 
reliability analysis continues with the DIII-D fusion 
experiment operated by General Atomics in La Jolla, 
California. Promising amounts of DIII-D data have been 
collected for instrumentation and controls and computer 
control systems. Another future study will focus on the 
personnel safety systems, including radiation area 
monitors and personnel safety interlock systems. All of 
these systems are shared with accelerators, and 
collaboration is always possible. Certainly, any already-
published accelerator component failure rate data will be 
used in comparison with the fusion component data 
analysis results. The EU continues to analyze operations 
data from the JET experiment near Oxford, UK.  
Other U.S. systems under analysis are the neutral 
beam injectors and radiofrequency plasma heating 
systems at DIII-D; results will be compared to results of 
EU analyses completed on the JET data.61,80 Comparisons 
of these independent data sets from the two tokamak 
experiments have been promising and serve to be the first 
steps toward data validation, at least on the order of 
magnitude level. Comparison to accelerator 
radiofrequency systems could prove to be useful as well. 
As the fusion machines under study continue to 
operate, some of the initial data analyses can be updated 
to verify that the failure rates are constant values as 
expected. If the rates deviate and are lower, then further 
investigation will be needed to determine if the values are 
indicating a new equilibrium; if higher values are found, 
then investigation will determine if this is an indication of 
the beginning of equipment wearout. 
The harvesting of generic data for design tradeoff or 
scoping studies, FMEAs, RAMI, and other system 
reliability uses will continue on an ad hoc basis to support 
fusion operations and new designs.  
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